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The Joint Labor Supply Decision of Married Couples





The current U.S. Social Security program redistributes resources from high-wage workers to low-wage
workers through its progressive benefit schedule and from two-earner couples and singles to one-earner
couples through its spousal and survivors benefits. This paper extends a standard general-equilibrium
overlapping-generations model with uninsurable wage shocks to analyze the effect of the spousal and sur-
vivors benefits on the labor supply of married households and the overall economy. The heterogeneous-
agent model calibrated to the current U.S. economy predicts that, in the long run, removing spousal and
survivors benefits would increase the female labor participation rate by 1.4%, the total working hours
of women by 1.6–1.7%, and the total output of the economy by 0.5–0.6%. Under the balanced-budget
assumption, a phased-in cohort-by-cohort removal of these benefits would make all age cohorts, on av-
erage, better off, although the policy change would make a majority of young married households worse
off in the short run.
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The current Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program of the U.S. Social Security system re-
distributes resources from high-wage workers to low-wage workers through its progressive benefit schedule
and from two-earner couples and singles to one-earner couples through spousal and survivors benefits. Due
to computational difficulty, most previous literature on the dynamic general-equilibrium analyses of So-
cial Security does not explicitly consider the redistribution between one-earner households and two-earner
households.1 However, because the effective payroll tax rate of secondary earners is higher in an economy
that provides spousal and survivors benefits, the exclusion of spousal and survivors benefits in the model
economy causes the model to potentially underestimate the labor supply distortion of the OASI payroll tax.
This paper extends a standard dynamic general equilibrium overlapping-generations (OLG) model with
uninsurable wage shocks by implementing the joint labor supply decision of married couples. Assuming the
spousal and survivors benefits under current law, this paper calibrates the heterogeneous-agent model to the
U.S. economy in recent years. Then, it analyzes to what extent the spousal and survivors benefits distort the
labor supply decision of married households and examines whether the government can improve the social
welfare without significantly reducing the insurance aspect of the current Social Security OASI program.
In the model economy, households are heterogeneous with respect to their marital status, age, wealth,
the husband’s wage rate, the wife’s wage rate, the husband’s average historical earnings, and the wife’s
average historical earnings. In each period, which is a year in the model economy, a working-age household
receives idiosyncratic wage shocks—one for the husband and another for the wife if married—and jointly
determines its consumption, working hours, and end-of-period wealth to maximize their rest-of-the-lifetime
utility, taking factor prices and government policy schedule as given.
This paper first constructs a baseline economy, which is on a balanced growth path, with the current
OASI system that includes spousal and survivors benefits. Then, the paper assumes that the government
removes the spousal and survivors benefits in a cohort-by-cohort phased-in manner, and it solves the model
for equilibrium transition paths under a couple of the government’s financing assumptions. Regarding the
Social Security budget, this paper assumes that it is separated from the rest of the government budget and that
workers’ own benefits (OA benefits) are increased proportionally to balance the budget, keeping the payroll
1For example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), I˙mrohorogˇlu, I˙mrohorogˇlu, and Joines (1995), Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser
(1999), Conesa and Krueger (1999), Nishiyama and Smetters (2007), and Huggett and Para (2010) all assume single-worker
households in their model economies.
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tax rate unchanged. Regarding the rest of the government budget, this paper assumes the government either
increases lump-sum transfer payments or reduces marginal income tax rates to balance the budget after the
policy change.
The main findings in this paper are as follows: If the spousal and survivors benefits were removed, in the
long run, the female labor participation rate would increase by 1.4%, the average working hours of female
workers would increase by 0.2–0.3%, depending on the government financing assumption, and the total
working hours of women would increase by 1.6–1.7%. The total working hours of men would decrease by
0.3%, however, because of the intrafamilial substitution. The total labor supply in efficiency units would
increase by 0.3–0.4%, the capital stock would increase by 0.8–1.0%, and the gross domestic product would
also increase by 0.5–0.6%. The macroeconomic effect would be larger if the government cut marginal
income tax rates to balance the rest of the government budget rather than increasing lump-sum transfers.
Because of the higher economic activity and the lower distortion from the Social Security benefit sched-
ule, future newborn (age-21) households would be, on average, better off by 0.4–0.5% in the long run with
the consumption equivalence measure. The welfare effect of the policy change would be greater (better) if
the government balanced the rest of its budget by increasing lump-sum transfer payments. The phased-in
removal of spousal and survivors benefits would make all age cohorts over the transition path, on average,
better off under both financing assumptions, although the policy change would make a majority of young
married households worse off in the short run.
To the best of my knowledge, few studies have used a large-scale dynamic general-equilibrium OLG
model to analyze the effect of spousal and survivors benefits on the labor supply of married households,
the macro economy, and social welfare. Kaygusuz (2014) is probably the first study that constructs a
heterogeneous-agent OLG model to explicitly analyze the effect of spousal and survivors’ benefits. Yet,
the present paper is different from Kaygusuz’s in several aspects: the present paper assumes uninsurable
idiosyncratic wage shocks in the model economy2 and solves the model for an equilibrium transition path
to check if the removal of these benefits, even in the short run, are welfare improving.3
Kaygusuz (2010) and Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2012a, 2012b) construct a deterministic general-
equilibrium OLG model with heterogeneous married and single households, similar to Kaygusuz (2014),
2If a husband and a wife are not certain about their future market wages and thus their own social security benefits, a possible
labor supply distortion caused by the spousal and survivors benefits will be attenuated especially when they are young.
3It is well known that partial privatization of the Social Security pension, for example, would hurt current generations through
its transition costs, even though future generations would gain from the reform in the long run.
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and these papers instead analyze the effect of the U.S. income tax system on the female labor supply. Hong
and Rı´os-Rull (2007) also construct a heterogeneous-agent OLG model of married and single households to
analyze the welfare effect of Social Security in the presence/absence of life insurance and annuity markets.
However, in their model, the household’s labor supply is inelastic, the age-earning profiles of the workers
are deterministic, and Social Security benefits are uniform and independent of the household’s earning
histories.4 Thus, the present paper contributes to the current literature by demonstrating how married couples
react to a future Social Security benefit schedule by both choosing their optimal labor supply and saving.
The present paper is also related to recent studies on the female labor supply with a partial-equilibrium
life cycle model. Olivetti (2006) constructs a life cycle model of married couples that includes the home
production of child care and learning-by-doing type human capital accumulation, and she analyzes the
importance of these factors on the increase in women’s market work hours. Attanasio, Low, and Sa´nchez-
Marcos (2008) also construct a life cycle model of the female labor participation (the male labor supply
is assumed to be inelastic). They explain how the female labor supply has been changed by the declining
cost of raising children and labor participation. They assume that the earnings of the husband and wife
are subject to positively correlated permanent shocks. Similar to these studies, the present paper assumes
unitary households—perfectly altruistic married couples—but focus more on the household’s reaction to
the current and future OASI policy. More recently, Bethencourt and Sa´nchez-Marcos (2014) construct a
partial-equilibrium life cycle model with married and widowed households, and they analyze the effect of
the U.S. Social Security system, including survivors benefits, on female labor participation rates.
The rest of this paper is presented as follows: Section 2 describes the heterogeneous-agent OLG model
with the joint decision-making of married couples, Section 3 shows the calibration of the baseline economy
to the U.S. economy, Section 4 explains the effects of removing spousal and survivors benefits in equilibrium
transition paths, Section 5 examines the robustness of the model, and Section 6 concludes the paper. The
appendix describes the computational algorithm used to solve the household’s optimization problem.
2 The Model Economy
The economy consists of a large number of overlapping-generations households, a perfectly compet-
itive representative firm with constant-returns-to-scale technology, and a government with a commitment
4Their model assumes that a married couple receives 150% of the average male benefit and that a widow receives 100% of the
average male benefit.
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technology. Time is discrete and one model period is a year.
2.1 The Households
There are three types of households in the model economy: married households where the husband and
wife are both alive (m = 0), single-male (never married or widowered) households (m = 1), and single-
female (never married or widowed) households (m = 2). The households, both married and single, enter the
economy at age i = 21. For simplicity, the husband and wife of each married household are of the same age.
In the model economy, a fixed proportion η of men and women are married when they enter the economy at
age 21 and never divorce, and 1 − η of men and women are single and never marry.5 They start receiving
Social Security benefits at age IR and live to at most age I = 100.
The households are heterogeneous with respect to the marital status, m = {0, 1, 2}; the age, i =
21, . . . , I; the beginning-of-period wealth, a ∈ A = [amin, amax]; the average historical earnings of the
husband (m = 0) or the single male (m = 1), b1 ∈ B = [0, bmax]; the average historical earnings of
the wife (m = 0) or the single female (m = 2), b2 ∈ B; the earning ability of the husband or the single
male, e1 ∈ E = [0, emax]; and the earning ability of the wife or the single female, e2 ∈ E. In each
period, t, a married household receives earning ability shocks, e1 and e2, and chooses joint consumption,
c, the husband’s hours of market work, h1, the wife’s hours of market work, h2, and the end-of-period
joint wealth, a′, to maximize their expected lifetime utility. Similarly, a single household receives earning
ability shocks, e1 or e2, and chooses consumption spending, c, the hours of market work, h1 or h2, and the
end-of-period wealth, a′, to maximize his or her expected lifetime utility.
The average historical earnings approximate the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). These his-
torical earnings determine the primary insurance amounts (PIA) of Social Security pension. The earning
abilities of the husband and wife follow the first-order Markov process, and these are correlated to each
other but independent of the mortality shocks. The PIA of a married or widow(er)ed household is calculated
separately for the husband and wife. For a married elderly household (m = 0), the secondary earner receives
either his or her own old-age retirement benefit or the spousal benefit (50% of the spouse’s old-age benefit),
whichever is higher. For a widow(er)ed elderly household (m = 1 or 2), the survivor receives either his or
her own old-age benefit or the survivors benefit (100% of the spouse’s old-age benefit), whichever is higher.6
5When η = 0.75, the share of married households is η/(η + 2(1 − η)) = 0.60, which is roughly consistent with the U.S.
economy.
6For more detailed descriptions of the Social Security (OASDI) program, see, for example, pp.9–19 of Social Security Admin-
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State Variables. Let s and St be the individual state of a household and the aggregate state of the economy
in year t, respectively,
s = (i, a, b1, b2, e1, e2,m), St = (x(s),WG,t),
where x(s) is the population density function of households, and WG,t is the government net worth at the
beginning of year t. Let Ψt be the government policy schedule as of year t,
Ψt =
{




where CG,t is government consumption, trLS,t is a lump sum transfer to each adult family member, τI,t(·)
is a progressive income tax function, τP,t(·) is a Social Security payroll tax function, trSS,t(·) is a Social
Security benefit function, WG,t+1 is the government net worth at the beginning of the next year, and qt is an
accidental bequest distributed through the government.
The Optimization Problem. Let v(s,St; Ψt) be the value function of a heterogeneous household at the
beginning of year t. The household’s optimization problem is then
v(s,St; Ψt) = max
c,h1,h2
{











subject to the constraints for the decision variables,
c > 0,(2)
0 ≤ h1 < 1 if m 6= 2, h1 = 0 if m = 2,(3)
0 ≤ h2 < 1− κnm,i if m 6= 1, h2 = 0 if m = 1,(4)
and the law of motion of the individual state,














(1 + rt)a+ wte1h1 + wte2h2 − τI,t(rta+ wte1h1 + wte2h2;m,nm,i)(6)






(i− 21)b1 + min(wte1h1, ϑmax)
]
+ 1{i≥IR or m=2}b1,(7)




(i− 21)b2 + min(wte2h2, ϑmax)
]
+ 1{i≥IR or m=1}b2,(8)
where u(·) is a period utility function, nm,i is the average number of newborn babies by age, χ(·) is a
random variable of utility from staying at home, β˜ is the growth-adjusted time discount factor, Πi(·|·) is the
transition probability function of exogenous state variables, and κ is the time cost of childbirth and childcare
per newborn baby, which is assumed only for a mother. In the budget constraint (the law of motion of a),
µ is the long-run productivity growth rate, rt is the interest rate, wt is the wage rate per efficiency unit of
labor, and 1{·} is an indicator function that returns 1 if the condition in { } holds and 0 otherwise. This
paper does not assume intergenerational bequest motives, and all working-age family members (i < IR)
receive uniform accidental bequests, qt. In the law of motion of b1 and b2, ϑmax are the maximum taxable
earnings for the OASI program. To describe a balanced growth path by a steady-state equilibrium, individual
variables other than working hours are normalized by using the long-run growth rate, 1 + µ.
Preferences. The household’s period utility function depends on the marital status. The utility function of
a single household (m = 1 or 2) is a combination of Cobb–Douglas and constant relative risk aversion,





1− γ if j = 1,[
cα(1− κn2,i − h2)1−α
]1−γ
1− γ if j = 2,
where the time cost parameter, κ, is used to replicate the average working hours of female workers relative to
the hours of male workers. The utility function of a married household (m = 0) has the following additively
separable form,














where 1− λ ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of joint consumption. All of the household consumption, c, is consumed
jointly when λ = 0, and all is consumed separately when λ = 1.7 With this specification, the growth-
adjusted time discount factor is calculated as β˜ = β(1 + µ)α(1−γ) when β is the unadjusted time discount
factor.
The Utility from Staying at Home. The household receives additional utility from home-produced ser-
vices when one of the adult family members stays at home, i.e., h1 = 0 or h2 = 0. The utility from staying
at home, χ(h1, h2;m,nm,i), follows the Gamma distribution with parameters α¯ and θ¯.8 The two parameters
are assumed to satisfy
E(χ) = α¯θ¯ =
 κ1 if (m = 0, h1 = 0, h2 > 0) or (m = 1, h1 = 0),κ1 + nm,iκ2 if (m = 0, h1 ≥ 0, h2 = 0) or (m = 2, h2 = 0),
where the coefficient κ1 indicates the utility from staying at home, and κ2 indicates an additional utility
from the mother’s childbirth and childcare per newborn baby. Parameters, κ1 and κ2, are used to match the
labor force participation rates of men and women ages 25–54 in the model economy to the data. The scale
parameter, θ¯, is set to be 2.0 thus E(χ) = α¯θ¯ = 2α¯ and V (χ) = α¯θ¯2 = 4α¯.9
The State Transition Function. The model assumes that the husband’s earning ability and the wife’s
earning ability are correlated to each other, but the deaths of the husband and wife are independent of each












2|e1, e2)pm,i(m′|m) if m = 0,
Πe1,i(e
′
1|e1)pm,i(m′|m) if m = 1,
Πe2,i(e
′
2|e2)pm,i(m′|m) if m = 2,
7The share of joint consumption in the total household consumption is calculated as (1 − λ)/(1 + λ). In a general set-
ting, the utility functions of a husband and wife can be defined separately, u1(c1, c2, h1, h2) = u˜1(c1, h1) + ϕu˜2(c2, h2) and
u2(c2, c1, h2, h1) = u˜2(c2, h2) + ϕu˜1(c1, h1), where ϕ ≤ 1 is the degree of altruism. The present study assumes that a married
couple is perfectly altruistic, ϕ = 1, and that their consumption is equal, c1 = c2 = c/(1 + λ). This paper then derives the unitary
utility function of a married couple described above. Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) and Brown and Poterba (2000) discuss the utility
function of a married couple with the inelastic labor supply.
8This paper uses the Gamma random variable for the utility from staying at home, because the Gamma distribution has a
formula to calculate the conditional expected value given one of the household’s members chooses to stay at home,E[χ−d|χ > d],
and it is more flexible than the exponential distribution that has only one parameter.
9For θ¯ between 1.0 and 5.0, the choice of θ¯ affects the aggregate economy very little when E(χ) = α¯θ¯ is kept unchanged.
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where Π(e1,e2),i(·), Πe1,i(·), and Πe2,i(·) are transition probability functions of earning ability. The transition
probabilities of the marital status are determined solely by the mortality rates of men and women as
pm,i(0|0) = φ1,iφ2,i, pm,i(1|0) = φ1,i(1− φ2,i), pm,i(2|0) = (1− φ1,i)φ2,i,
pm,i(0|1) = 0, pm,i(1|1) = φ1,i, pm,i(2|1) = 0,
pm,i(0|2) = 0, pm,i(1|2) = 0, pm,i(2|2) = φ2,i,
where φ1,i and φ2,i are the conditional survival rates of men and women, respectively, at the end of age i
given that they are alive at the beginning of age i.
The Income Tax Function. Let y be the taxable income of a household,
y = max
(
rta+ wte1h1 + wte2h2 − (1 + 1{m=0})ξ, 0
)
,
where ξ is the sum of the standard deduction and exemptions per adult family member. The individual
income tax function is one of Gouveia and Strauss (1994),
τI,t(y;m) = ϕt
[
y − (y−ϕm,1 + ϕm,2)−1/ϕm,1] ,
where the parameters (thus progressive tax rates) depend on the marital status: m = 0 (married filing jointly)
or m = 1, 2 (single).
Social Security Pensions. Let y1 = wte1h1 and y2 = wte2h2 be the earnings of the husband and the wife,
respectively, and let ϑmax be the maximum taxable earnings for the OASI program. Then, the OASI payroll
tax function is
τP,t(y1, y2) = τ¯P,t
[
min(y1, ϑmax) + min(y2, ϑmax)
]
,
where τ¯P,t is a flat OASI tax rate that includes the employer portion of the tax. Let ϑ1 and ϑ2 be the
thresholds for the 3 replacement rate brackets (90%, 32%, and 15%) that calculate the primary insurance
amount (PIA) from the average historical earnings. The PIA’s of the husband and the wife, ψ(i, b1) and
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ψ(i, b2), are then
ψ(i, bj) = 1{i≥IR}(1 + µ)
60−i{0.90 min(bj , ϑ1)
+ 0.32 max [min(bj , ϑ2)− ϑ1, 0] + 0.15 max(bj − ϑ2, 0)
}
for j = 1, 2,
and the current-law OASI benefit function of each household is
trSS,t(i, b1, b2,m) =
 ψt max
[
ψ(i, b1) + ψ(i, b2), 1.5ψ(i, b1), 1.5ψ(i, b2)
]
if m = 0,
ψt max
[
ψ(i, b1), ψ(i, b2)
]
if m = 1, 2,
where ψt is an OASI benefit adjustment factor. The adjustment factor is set at 1.0 in the baseline economy.
When both the husband and the wife are alive (m = 0), the household’s OASI benefit is 1.5ψ(i, b1) if
ψ(i, b2) < 0.5ψ(i, b1), it is 1.5ψ(i, b2) if ψ(i, b1) < 0.5ψ(i, b2), and it is ψ(i, b1) + ψ(i, b2) otherwise.
When one of those is deceased (m = 1, 2), the OASI benefit is either ψ(i, b1) or ψ(i, b2), whichever is
larger.
Decision Rules. Solving the household’s problem for c, h1, and h2 for all possible states, the household’s
decision rules, c(s,St; Ψt), h1(s,St; Ψt), and h2(s,St; Ψt), are obtained numerically.10 The other decision





(1 + rt)a+ wte1h1(s,St; Ψt) + wte2h2(s,St; Ψt)
− τI,t
(




wte1h1(s,St; Ψt), wte2h2(s,St; Ψt)
)
+ trSS,t(i, b1, b2,m)
+ (1 + 1{m=0})(trLS,t + 1{i<IR}qt)− c(s,St; Ψt)
] ≥ a′min(s),




(i− 21)b1 + min(wte1h1(s,St; Ψt), ϑmax)
]
+ 1{i≥IR or m=2}b1,




(i− 21)b2 + min(wte2h2(s,St; Ψt), ϑmax)
]
+ 1{i≥IR or m=1}b2.
The Distribution of Households. Let xt(s) be the growth-adjusted population density of households in
period t, and let Xt(s) be the corresponding cumulative distribution function. At age 21, a proportion η of
10This paper discretizes the individual state space and solves the Kuhn–Tucker conditions of the household problem for each
state by using a Newton-type nonlinear equation solver (a modified Powell hybrid algorithm). See the Appendix for the computa-
tional algorithm used to solve the problem.
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men and women are married and a proportion 1−η are single. For simplicity, households enter the economy
with no assets and working histories, i.e., a = b1 = b2 = 0. The growth-adjusted populations of 21-year-old
men and women are both normalized to unity. Thus, the populations of 21-year-old households are
∫
A×B2×E2
dXt(21, a, b1, b2, e1, e2,m = 0) =
∫
E2
dXt(21, 0, 0, 0, e1, e2, 0) = η,∫
A×B2×E2
dXt(21, a, b1, b2, e1, e2,m = 1) =
∫
E
dXt(21, 0, 0, 0, e1, 0, 1) = 1− η,∫
A×B2×E2
dXt(21, a, b1, b2, e1, e2,m = 2) =
∫
E
dXt(21, 0, 0, 0, 0, e2, 2) = 1− η,
and the total population of 21-year-old households is 2 − η. Let ν be the time-invariant population growth










× pii(e′1, e′2,m′|e1, e2,m)dXt(s),
where pii(e′1, e′2,m′|e1, e2,m) is the transition probability density function of the exogenous state variables.
Aggregation. The growth-adjusted private wealth, WP,t, the capital stock (national wealth), Kt, in a

















(e1h1(s,St; Ψt) + e2h2(s,St; Ψt)) dXt(s).
2.2 The Firm
In each period, the representative firm chooses the capital input, K˜t, and efficiency labor input, L˜t, to
maximize its profit, taking factor prices, rt and wt, as given, i.e.,
(9) max
K˜t,L˜t
F (K˜t, L˜t)− (rt + δ)K˜t − wtL˜t,
11
where F (·) is a constant-returns-to-scale production function,





with the growth-adjusted total factor productivity A, and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. The profit
maximizing conditions are
(10) FK(K˜t, L˜t) = rt + δ, FL(K˜t, L˜t) = wt,
and the factor markets are cleared when Kt = K˜t and Lt = L˜t.
2.3 The Government
In the model economy, the payroll tax rate is fixed at the same level, and the benefits are adjusted









τP,t(wte1h1(s,St; Ψt), wte2h2(s,St; Ψt); τ¯P,t)dXt(s),









In the baseline economy, the parameter, ψt, of the benefit function set at 1.0 and the OASI residual is
calculated as TRO = TP,t(τ¯P,t)−TRSS,t(ψt). The OASI residual includes the OASI benefits not considered
in this model economy and the administrative costs. In the policy experiments below, τ¯P,t and TRO are kept
at the baseline levels, and the benefit parameter, ψt, is adjusted so that the OASI budget is balanced, i.e.,
TRSS,t(ψt) = TP,t(τ¯P,t)− TRO.
11If a policy change increases the labor income of working-age households, then all other things being equal, the elderly
households will also be better off through the increased social security benefit under this assumption.
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τI,t(rta+wte1h1(s,St; Ψt)+wte2h2(s,St; Ψt);m,nm,i, ϕt)dXt(s),








(1 + 1{m=0})trLS,t dXt(s).
The government collects accidental bequests—remaining wealth held by deceased households—at the
end of period t and uniformly distributes the bequests to all working-age adults in the same period.12 The








(1− φm,i)(1 + µ)a′(s,St; Ψt)dXt(s),
where the survival rate of married couple (m = 0) is calculated as φ0,i = 1 − (1 − φ1,i)(1 − φ2,i). The












The law of motion of government net worth is
(17) WG,t+1 =
1
(1 + µ)(1 + ν)
[
(1 + rt)WG,t + TI,t(ϕt)− CG,t − TRLS,t(trLS,t)
]
.
Note that the aggregate variables are normalized by the long-run productivity growth rate, 1 + µ, and the
population growth rate, 1 + ν, so that the balanced growth path of the economy is obtained as a steady-state
equilibrium.
2.4 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
The recursive competitive equilibrium of this model economy is defined as follows.
12Since there are no aggregate shocks in the model economy, the government can perfectly predict the sum of accidental bequests
during the period.
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DEFINITION Recursive Competitive Equilibrium: Let s = (i, a, b1, b2, e1, e2,m) be the individual state
of the households, let St = (x(s),WG,t) be the state of the economy, and let Ψt be the government policy
schedule known at the beginning of period t,
Ψt =
{




A time series of factor prices and the government policy variables,
Ωt =
{




where ϕt is a parameter of the individual income tax function, τ¯P,t is a parameter of the payroll tax func-
tion, and ψt is a parameter of the Social Security benefit function; the value functions of households,
{v(s,Ss; Ψs)}∞s=t, the decision rules of households,
{
c(s,Ss; Ψs), h1(s,Ss; Ψs), h2(s,Ss; Ψs), a






and the distribution of households, {xs(s)}∞s=t, are in a recursive competitive equilibrium if, for all s =
t, . . . ,∞, (i) each household solves the optimization problem (1)-(8), taking Ss and Ψs as given; (ii) the
firm solves its profit maximization problem (9)-(10); (iii) the government policy schedule is satisfied (11)-
(17); and (iv) the goods and factor markets are cleared. The economy is in a steady-state equilibrium and on
a balanced growth path if, in addition, Ss = Ss+1 and Ψs+1 = Ψs for all s = t, . . . ,∞.
3 Calibration
The model is calibrated to the 2013 U.S. economy with the current-law Social Security system that
includes the spousal and survivors benefits. The baseline economy is assumed to be in a steady-state (sta-
tionary) equilibrium and on a balanced-growth path. Table 1 shows the target variables and values in the
baseline economy, and Table 2 shows the main parameter values and the baseline government policy values.
The discount factor, β, of households is set at 0.9804 so that the capital–output ratio, Kt/Yt, is 2.8 in the
baseline economy. The depreciation rate of the capital stock, δ, is set at 7.5% so that the interest rate, rt, is
5.0% in the baseline economy. The growth-adjusted total factor productivity, A, of the production function
14
Table 1: Target variables and values in the baseline economy
Target variables Target Baseline Determined mainly by
(Just-identifying restrictions) values values
Capital-output ratio Kt/Yt 2.80 2.80 Discount factor β
Interest rate rt 0.05 0.05 Depreciation rate δ
Wage rate wt 1.00 1.00 Total factor productivity A
Income tax revenue / output TI,t/Yt 0.10 0.10 Tax parameter ϕt
Frisch elasticity of working hours (average worker) 0.50 0.50 Consumption share parameter α
Labor force participation rate: men (ages 25-54) 0.887 0.887 Utility parameter κ1
Labor force participation rate: women (ages 25-54) 0.745 0.745 Utility parameter per newborn κ2
Female work hours / male work hours (all workers) 0.895 0.895 Time cost per newborn κ
Target variables Target Baseline Determined mainly by
(Overidentifying restrictions) values values
OASI benefit share: workers benefits 80.1–81.2% 80.5% Auto correlation parameter of log wage ρ
: spousal benefits 4.1–4.3% 3.9%
: survivors benefits 14.7–15.6% 15.6%
Variance of log labor income by age 0.40–1.00 0.46–0.96 Standard deviation of log wage shocks σ
is set at 0.9228 to normalize the wage rate, wt, to unity. The limit of the effective marginal income tax rate,
ϕt, is set at 33.6% so that the government’s income tax revenue is 10.0% of the total output in the baseline
economy.
The share parameter of consumption, α, in the utility function is set at 0.6563 so that the Frisch elasticity
of the average worker (the worker with the average work hours) is 0.5. The parameters of utility from staying
at home, κ1 and κ2, are set at 0.4427 and 1.6928, respectively, so that the labor force participation rates of
men and women ages 25–54 are 88.7% and 74.5%, respectively. The parameter of time cost for childbirth
and childcare, κ, is chosen to be 1.1812 so that the average work hours of female workers is 89.5% of the
average male work hours. The autocorrelation parameter, ρ, of log wage (earning ability) is set at 0.87, and
the standard deviation of log wage shocks is set at 0.39, so that
• the variance of the household’s log labor income by age in the baseline economy is consistent with
the recent survey data (the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances);
• the shares of old-age retirement benefits, spousal benefits, and survivors benefits in total OASI benefits
are close to the recent Social Security statistics (Social Security Administration, 2014).
The autocorrelation parameter and the standard deviation concurrently determine both the labor income
15
Table 2: Main parameter values and baseline government policy values
Parameters Values Comments / Targets
Maximum possible age I 100
Retirement age IR 66 Current full retirement agea
Share of married people at age 21 η 0.75 Share of married households 0.60b
Productivity growth rate µ 0.018 Average rate in 1981–2013
Population growth rate ν 0.010 Average rate in 1981–2013
Discount factor β 0.9804 Kt/Yt = 2.8 in the baseline
Growth-adjusted discount factor β˜ 0.9690 β˜ = β(1 + µ)α(1−γ)
Share parameter of consumption α 0.6563 Frisch elasticity 0.5
Coefficient of relative risk aversion γ 2.0
Adjustment parameter of consumption λ 0.6 Bernheim et al. (2008)
Utility from staying at home (common) κ1 0.4427 Male (ages 25–54) participation rate 88.7%
Utility from staying at home (childbirth/care) κ2 1.6928 Female (ages 25–54) participation rate 74.5%
Time cost parameter for women κ 1.1812 Female-male working hour ratio 0.895
Autocorrelation parameter of log wage ρ 0.87 Shares of spousal and survivors benefits
Standard deviation of log wage shocks σ 0.390 Survey of Consumer Finances (2010)
Average median wage: men aged 21–65 e¯1 1.0
Intrafamily wage correlation ω 0.25 Hyslop (2001) with adjustment
Share parameter of capital stock θ 0.35 NIPA data
Depreciation rate of capital stock δ 0.0750 r = 0.050 in the baseline
Total factor productivity A 0.9228 w = 1.0 in the baseline
Income tax parameters: tax rate limit ϕt 0.3360 TI,t/Yt = 0.10 in the baseline
married (m = 0) : curvature ϕm,1 0.8564
}
Estimated by OLS: scale ϕm,2 0.3604
single (m = 1, 2): curvature ϕm,1 0.6785
}
Estimated by OLS: scale ϕm,2 0.4575
Standard deduction per person ξ1 0.0977 $6,100 in 2013c
Exemption per family member ξ2 0.0624 $3,900 in 2013
Social Security payroll tax rate τ¯P,t 0.1007 Effective OASI tax rate 0.106/1.053
Maximum taxable earnings ϑmax 1.8203 $113,700 in 2013
Replacement rate threshold: 0.90 & 0.32 ϑ1 0.1520 $791× 12 = $9,492 in 2013
: 0.32 & 0.15 ϑ2 0.9160 $4, 768× 12 = $57,216 in 2013
Government consumption CG,t 8.2962
Lump-sum transfers per person trLS,t 0.0
OASI benefit adjustment factor ψt 1.0
OASI residual TRO 0.2456 TRO = TP,t − TRSS,t
Government net worth WG,t 15.8985 WG,t/Yt = 0.20 in the baseline
Accidental bequests per working-age adult qt 0.0209
aWhen the population of age-21 men and women are both normalized to unity, working age population (aged 21–66)
is 70.13, and retired population (aged 66–100) is 17.99 in the model economy. bWhen η is 0.75, the number of
working-age households is 44.80, and the number of retired households is 13.76. cOne model unit is equal to $62,461
in 2013 growth-adjusted dollars.
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inequality of each age and the lifetime labor income inequality, and the latter mainly affects the shares of
spousal and survivors benefits in total OASI benefits.
3.1 Demographics
Households are assumed to enter the economy beginning at age 21 and possibly live up to age 100
(I = 100). For simplicity, all households are assumed to start receiving their Social Security benefits when
the members turn age 66 (IR = 66), which is the current full retirement age for workers born in 1943–
54. From the estimates by the Social Security Administration (SSA), the average population growth rate is
calculated as 0.96% in 1980–2013. The population growth rate, ν, in the model economy is set at 1.0%.
The conditional survival rates of men and women at the end of each year of age, φ1,i and φ2,i, are calculated
from Table 4.C6 2009 Period Life Table in SSA (2014). The survival rates at the end of age 100 are replaced
with zero. For simplicity, households are assumed to be either married or single households at age 21, and
the model abstracts from possible marriages and divorces. Thus, the transition matrix of the marital status,
Πm,i = [p(m
′|m)] for i < I − 1, is solely determined by the survival rates as
Πm,i =
φ1,iφ2,i φ1,i(1− φ2,i) (1− φ1,i)φ2,i0 φ1,i 0
0 0 φ2,i
 .
To avoid introducing an additional heterogeneity of households to the model economy, the numbers of
newborn babies, nm,i, in a married household and a single female household are assumed to be uniform
and only dependent on the marital status (m = 0 or 2) and age of the household. The average number of
newborn babies by age in a household is calculated from the age-specific fertility rates for 2006 in United
Nations (2008). The fertility rates of 5-year age groups of women (ages 15–19, 20–24, . . . , 45–49) are
smoothed out by linear regression. Figure 1 shows the average number of newborn babies assumed in the
model economy.
3.2 Household Preferences
The coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, for the combination of consumption and leisure is set at 2.0,
which is within the range of numbers assumed in macroeconomic and public finance literature.13 The share
13For example, Domeij and Heathcote (2004) use 1.0, I˙mrohorog˘lu, I˙mrohorog˘lu, and Joines (1995) use 2.0, and Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987) and Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) use 4.0.
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parameter of consumption in the utility function, α, is set at 0.6563 so that the Frisch elasticity of working
hours for the average worker (the worker with the average working hours, h¯) is 0.5. In this paper, the Frisch






where h¯ = 0.6235 in the baseline economy.




= 1− α(1− γ) = 1− 0.6563(1− 2.0) = 1.6563.
















1− (1− 0.6563)(1− 2.0) = 0.4494,
where w˜t is the after-tax wage rate of the household. The elasticity of substitution of the husband’s market
work hours for the wife’s hours is also approximately 0.4494. The consumption adjustment factor for a
married couple, λ is assumed to be 0.6, following Bernheim, Forni, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff (2003).14
14Attanasio, Low, and Sa´nchez-Marcos (2008) use the parameter value corresponding to λ = 0.67. The difference between 0.6
and 0.67 is almost negligible in the policy experiments.
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According to Table 3 of Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013a), the labor force participation rates of men
and women ages 25–54 in 2012 are 88.7% and 74.5%, respectively. The parameters of utility from staying
at home, κ1 and κ2, are set at 0.4427 and 1.6928, respectively, so that the labor force participation rates of
men and women are matched to the data. Using Table 5 of Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013b), the average
weekly working hours of female workers is calculated as 36.7 in 2012, which is 89.5% of the average male
working hours, 41.0. The parameter of time cost for childbirth and childcare, κ, is set at 1.1812 per newborn
baby so that the average work hours of female workers (ages 21–65) is 89.5% of the average male work
hours.
The discount factor of households, β, is set at 0.9804 so that the capital–output ratio, Kt/Yt, is equal
to 2.8 in the baseline economy. According to the national income and product accounts (NIPA) and fixed
assets accounts (FAA), the capital–output ratio in the United States, defined by the ratio of the fixed assets
to GDP, is on average 2.99 in 2007–2013. According to International Investment Position Tables (IIP), net
international investment position is on average –0.196 as a share of GDP in the same period. So, the capital–
output ratio, defined by the ratio of the fixed assets owned by the U.S. residents to GDP, is lowered to 2.8 in
the model economy. For simplicity, the present paper assumes a closed economy and the capital stock to be
equal to national wealth. The ratio of government fixed assets to GDP is on average 0.73, and the debt held
by the public is on average 51% of GDP, in 2007–2013. Thus, the ratio of government net worth to output,
WG,t/Yt, is set to be 0.2, and the ratio of private wealth to output, WP,t/Yt, is 2.6 in the baseline economy.
3.3 Production Technology
The share parameter of capital, θ, is set at 0.35, which is roughly consistent with the NIPA data.15 The
depreciation rate of the capital stock, δ, is chosen so that the interest rate, rt, is 5.0%, and the total factor
productivity scalar, A, is adjusted so that the average wage rate, wt, is normalized to 1.0 in the baseline
economy. When the capital–output ratio, Kt/Yt, is 2.8, the Cobb–Douglas production function implies






= 0.125 =⇒ δ = 0.125− rt = 0.125− 0.05 = 0.075,










= 0.650.652.80.35A = 1.0 =⇒ A = 0.9228.
15In 2007–2013, labor income is on average 59.3% of GDP, capital income (including depreciations) is 34.2% of GDP, and
taxes on production and imports less subsidies are the remainder.
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According to the NIPA data, the average growth rate of real GDP per capita (in chained 2009 dollars) is
1.76% between 1981 and 2013. The labor-augmenting productivity growth rate, µ, is set at 1.8% in the
model economy. The growth-adjusted time discount factor is thus calculated as
β˜ = β(1 + µ)α(1−γ) = 0.9804(1 + 0.018)0.6563(1−2.0) = 0.9690.
3.4 Earning Ability Processes
The individual earning ability processes of men and women, e1,i and e2,i, of age i = 21, . . . , 65 in the
model economy are assumed to be
ln ej,i = ln e¯j,i + ln zj,i,
for j = 1 and 2, where e¯j,i is the median wage rate of men or women at age i. The persistent shock, zj,i,
follows an AR(1) process,
ln zj,i = ρ ln zj,i−1 + j,i
for i = 22, . . . , 65, where j,i ∼ N(0, σ2). The auto-correlation parameter, ρ, is assumed to be 0.87, and
the standard deviation, σ, is set at 0.39 for all i and j. The log deviation from the mean, ln zi, is normally
distributed and the variance is increasing in age. The variance of the age-21 log working ability, ln zj,21, is
set as
V (ln zj,21) = 0.4 lim
i→∞







and the variance of ln zj,i is calculated as
V (ln zj,i+1) = ρ
2V (ln zj,i) + σ
2
for i = 22, . . . , 65, so that the variance of log labor income by age is close to those calculated from the
household wage income data in the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The coefficient 0.4 < 1
is chosen so that the variance of log earnings increases with the household’s age. Figure 2 shows that the
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Sources: Author’ calculations and the 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances (FRB, 2012).
variances of log labor income calculated using the 2010 SCF data (FRB, 2012) and those in the baseline
economy are similar.
The median wage rates (earning abilities) of men and women ages 21–65, e¯1,i and e¯2,i, are constructed by
using the 2011 median earnings of workers by sex and age in Table 4.B6 in Social Security Administration
(2014). Because the median earnings are not shown for all ages in the table, the numbers are interpolated
by using OLS for ages 21–70. Under this assumption, the average median earnings of women ages 21–65
is 70.2% of that of men of the same age group. In 2012, the median earnings of full-time female workers
ages 21–65 is 80.4% of that of full-time male workers of the same age group, according to Bureau of
Labor Statistics (2013b). To convert the earnings profile to the full-time equivalent wage profile, the female
earnings are multiplied by 80.5/70.2. Figure 3 shows the original median earnings and the estimated earning
ability profiles. The median wage rates are then normalized so that the population-weighted average of male
median wages for ages 21–65 is 1.0. Under this normalization, the weighted average of female median
wages is 0.804.
In the baseline economy, the average labor income of all working-age households is 1.1534. The average
labor income of working-age households (ages 21–65) is $63,754 in the 2010 SCF (FRB, 2012). Because
labor income per capita increased about 13% between 2010 and 2013, the average household labor income
is estimated as $72,042 in 2013. Thus, in the baseline economy, one model unit is approximately equal to
$72,042/1.1534 = $62,461 in 2013 growth-adjusted dollars.
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Sources: Author’ calculations and Table 4.B6 in Social Secrurity Administration (2014).
As mentioned above, the autocorrelation parameter, ρ, is assumed to be 0.87, and the standard deviation,
σ, of the transitory shock is set at 0.39. The log persistent shock, ln zj,i, is first discretized into 11 levels each
by using the Gauss-Hermite quadrature nodes, and 5 levels of ln zj,i are then generated by combining 4 nodes
in each tail distribution into one node. The unconditional probability distribution of single households is
pie1,i = pie2,i = (0.0731, 0.2422, 0.3694, 0.2422, 0.0731)
′ for i = 21, . . . , 65. The tail nodes are combined
because matching the tail distributions of the wage rate is less important in this paper. The Markov transition
matrix for single households, Πe1,i = [pi(e
j′
1,i+1|ej1,i)] and Πe2,i = [pi(ek
′
2,i+1|ek2,i)] for i = 21, . . . , 64, that
corresponds to ρ = 0.87 is calculated by using the bivariate normal distribution function as
Πe1,i = Πe2,i =

0.7337 0.2652 0.0011 0.0000 0.0000
0.0800 0.7126 0.2068 0.0006 0.0000
0.0002 0.1356 0.7283 0.1356 0.0002
0.0000 0.0006 0.2068 0.7126 0.0800
0.0000 0.0000 0.0011 0.2652 0.7337
 .
The earning ability processes of the husband and wife in a married household are assumed to be cor-
related. Suppose that, in each period, the wage rates of the husband and wife are perfectly correlated with
probability ω and uncorrelated with probability 1 − ω. Then, the unconditional probability distribution of
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married households is obtained as
pi(e1,e2),i = ω diag(pie1,i) + (1− ω) (pie1,i)(pie2,i)′.




2,i+1|ej1,i, ek2,i)], that corre-







 ωˆ 1{j′=k′} pi(e
j









2,i+1|ek2,i) if j 6= k,
where ωˆ is the conditional probability for a married household to be a perfectly-correlated household given
that they are on the diagonal, j = k,
ωˆ =
ω
ω + (1− ω)(pie1,i)′(pie2,i)
.
According to Hyslop (2001), the correlation between male and female wages (earnings) of married house-
holds with both spouses working is 0.340 (0.246). Assuming that the correlation between (potential) wages
of households with only one of those working is smaller, in this paper, the intrafamily earning-ability corre-
lation is set to be ω = 0.25.





(1 + µ)amin(i+ 1)− 0.07w¯e11,i+1hmax
]
/(1 + r¯) if i = 21, . . . , I − 1,
0 if i = I,
where e11,i+1 is the lowest male working ability of age i + 1, and where r¯, w¯, and h¯ are the interest rate,
the wage rate, and the average working hours, respectively, in the baseline economy. One might expect
minimum assets to be set at what a household could repay under the worst possible realizations for working
ability, which is known as the natural borrowing constraint. However, labor income with the lowest working
ability and with longest working hours is instead multiplied by 0.07 to align household debt to the U.S.
economy. According to the 2010 SCF (FRB, 2012), 11.0% of households have negative net worth, and
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their average net debt is $31,447 ($3,459 per household). In the model economy, 23.3% of households have
negative wealth, and their average debt corresponds to $14,849 ($3,460 per household).
3.5 The Government’s Policy Functions
The parameters of the Gouveia–Strauss type individual income tax function are estimated by OLS using
statutory marginal tax rates in 2013. One of the parameters, ϕt, is the limit of the marginal tax rate as taxable
income goes to infinity. Thus, ϕt is first set at 0.396, the highest marginal tax rate in 2013. The other two
parameters, ϕm,1 and ϕm,2, are estimated by OLS (equally weighted for taxable income between $0 and
$600,000), separately for both married households filing jointly and single households. Then, ϕt is adjusted
to 0.3360 to reflect effective income tax rates and to make the individual income tax revenue, TI,t, 10.0% of
GDP in the baseline economy. Figure 4 indicates the statutory and estimated marginal income tax rates.
The OASI payroll tax rate is 5.3% for an employee and 5.3% for an employer. Thus, τ¯P,t is set at
0.106/1.053 = 0.1007. The thresholds to calculate primary insurance amounts (PIA) are set for each of the
age cohorts when they reach age 62 in the U.S. system. For simplicity, the growth-adjusted thresholds for all
the age cohorts are fixed in the model economy, and the PIA of each age cohort is adjusted later by using the
long-term productivity growth rate and the number of the years from age 60. Thus, after a scale adjustment,
the model simply uses the thresholds for the 62-year-old cohort in 2013. The OASDI benefit adjustment
factor, ψt, is 1.0 in the baseline economy. To balance the OASI budget, the OASI residual, TRO, is set
at 0.2456, which is 5.7% of the OASI payroll tax revenue in the baseline economy. This residual includes
Social Security benefits received by the children and parents of the workers as well as administration cotst,
24
Table 3: The Shares of OASI Benefits by Type of Recipients (percent)
Year Retired Wives and Widows and
workers husbands widowers
2008 78.9 4.5 16.6
2009 79.5 4.4 16.1
2010 80.1 4.3 15.5
2011 80.6 4.2 15.1
2012 81.2 4.1 14.7
2008–2012 average 80.1 4.3 15.6
Baseline 80.5 3.9 15.6
Source: Author’s calculations from Table 4.A5 in Social Security Administration (2014).
which are abstracted from in this paper.
3.6 Baseline Economy
Table 3 shows the shares of OASI benefits by type of recipients in the data (Social Security Adminis-
tration, 2014) and the baseline economy. The calibration targets are the shares in 2012 and the averages in
the recent five years. The shares of the old-age retirement benefits, spousal benefits, and survivors benefits
(received by spouses) are 80.5%, 3.9%, and 15.6%, respectively. The first and third numbers are within the
ranges of corresponding target values, but the share of the spousal benefits, 3.9%, in the baseline economy
is smaller than the share, 4.1%, in the 2012 data. Yet, the baseline economy captures the Social Security’s
spousal and survivors benefits fairly well.16
Figure 5 shows the labor participation rates by age of men and women in the data (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 2013) and the baseline economy. As explained above, the average labor participation rates of men
and women ages 25–54 are targeted to 88.7% and 74.5%, respectively. So, the model economy captures
the labor force participation rates of men and women ages 25–54 well. However, the model is not very
successful to replicate the lower labor force participation rates of those ages 20–24 and ages 55 and older.
There are several reasons for this inconsistency. First, the model in this paper does not incorporate
the household’s demand for schooling and a possible financial assistance from their parents. So, in the
model economy, young households with no or little wealth tend to work even if their wages are relatively
16The shares of the spousal and survivors benefits are both declining in recent years. The share of the spousal benefits will likely
decrease in the near future, too, as the gender wage gap has been narrowing in recent decades. It is not clear, however, if the share
of the survivors benefits will continue decreasing. The share is declining in recent years partly because baby-boom generations
have recently retired and started receiving Social Security benefits, but they are still too young to receive survivors benefits.
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Men (2012) Men (Model) Women (2012) Women (Model)
Source: Table 3.3 in Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013) and author’s calculations.
low. Second, the model does not incorporate the health condition of the households when they get older.
The health condition would affect not only their wages but also the disutility from working. For those
households ages 55 and older, their decisions on labor participation and retirement depends strongly on their
health condition, the availability of health insurance, and the eligibility of disability insurance. However,
in the model economy, the average timing of the retirement of workers as well as the average labor force
participation of those ages 55–70 are roughly consistent with the data.
4 Removing Spousal and Survivors Benefits
The policy experiments in this paper are straightforward. The economy is assumed to be in the initial
steady-state equilibrium (and on the balanced growth path) in year 0. Starting at the beginning of year 1, the
government removes the spousal and survivors benefits of the current OASI program cohort by cohort in a
phased-in manner.
More specifically, for households ages 61 or older in year 1, their OASI benefit function is unchanged
because it is too late for these households to adjust their labor supply to the policy change. Thus, for
i− (t− 1) ≥ 61 and 1 ≤ t ≤ I − 60 = 40,
tr0SS,t(i, b1, b2,m) =
 ψt(ψ0/ψT ) max
[
ψ(i, b1) + ψ(i, b2), 1.5ψ(i, b1), 1.5ψ(i, b2)
]
if m = 0,
ψt(ψ0/ψT ) max
[
ψ(i, b1), ψ(i, b2)
]
if m = 1, 2,
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where ψ0 and ψT are benefit adjustment parameters in the initial steady state and the final steady state, re-
spectively, and ψt is adjusted to balance the OASI budget in each transition period. Because the government
introduces the policy change cohort by cohort, most current households continue receiving (part of) spousal
and survivors benefits. To keep generational equity, in this experiment, the government first discounts the
benefits under the old schedule with ψ0/ψT , then it adjusts all benefits proportionally with ψt to balance the
Social Security budget each year.
For households ages 21 or younger in year 1, their OASI benefit function is fully replaced by the new
benefit function without spousal and survivors benefits, i.e., for i− (t− 1) ≤ 21 and t ≥ IR − 20 = 46,
tr1SS,t(i, b1, b2,m) =
 ψt
[
ψ(i, b1) + ψ(i, b2)
]
if m = 0,
ψt ψ(i, bj) if m = j = 1, 2.
Finally, for households ages 22–60 in year 1, their possible spousal and survivors benefits are reduced
linearly cohort by cohort. The OASI benefit function is set as the weighted average of the above two
functions, i.e., for 22 ≤ i− (t− 1) ≤ 60 and 6 = IR − 60 ≤ t ≤ I − 21 = 79,
trSS,t(i, b1, b2,m) =
(i− 20)− t
40
tr0SS,t(i, b1, b2,m) +
(




The Government’s Financing Assumptions. Any changes in the current Social Security system would
alter the government’s income and payroll tax revenue. If spousal and survivors benefits were eliminated,
then all other things being equal, the government’s benefit expenditures would decrease and the payroll tax
revenue would likely increase because of a larger labor supply. For simplicity, the OASI budget is balanced
each year in the model economy, the payroll tax rate, τ¯P,t, is fixed at the baseline level, and the OASI
benefits are changed proportionally each year by the adjustment factor, ψt, to match the benefit expenditure
to the payroll tax revenue. For the rest of the government budget, the removal of spousal and survivors
benefits would likely increase the labor supply, thus increasing individual income tax revenues. The rest of
the government budget is also balanced each year, and either the lump-sum transfer, trLS,t, or the marginal
income tax rate parameter, ϕt, is changed to balance the budget. The government’s financing rules assumed
in this paper are summarized as follows:
(a) trLS,t ←− TRLS,t(trLS,t) = TI,t(ϕ0)− CG,0 + (1 + rt)WG,t − (1 + µ)(1 + ν)WG,t+1,
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WG,t+1 = WG,t;
(b) ϕt ←− TI,t(ϕt) = CG,0 + TRLS,t(trLS,0)− (1 + rt)WG,t + (1 + µ)(1 + ν)WG,t+1,
WG,t+1 = WG,t;
(a) and (b) ψt ←− TRSS,t(ψt) = TP,t(τ¯P,0)− TRO.
Welfare Measure. The change in social welfare by the policy reform is evaluated based on the ex ante
expected (remaining) lifetime utility of each age cohort (the veil of ignorance). The welfare gains or losses
of age-21 households at the beginning of t = 1, . . . ,∞ are calculated as the uniform percentage changes,
λ21,t, in the baseline consumption path, such that these changes would make the household’s expected










where s21 = (21, a, b1, b2, e1, e2,m). Similarly, the average welfare changes of households of age i at the
time of the policy change (t = 1) are calculated as the uniform percent changes, λi,1, which are required in
the baseline consumption path so that the rest-of-the-lifetime value would be equal to the rest-of-the-lifetime










Note that λi,1 for i = I, . . . , 1 shows the cohort-average welfare changes of all current households alive at
the time of the policy change, and λ21,t for t = 2, . . . ,∞ shows the cohort-average welfare changes of all
future households.
4.1 Long-Run Effects Over the Life Cycle
Figure 6 shows the long-run effects of removing spousal and survivors benefits over the life cycle. In
each of the 8 charts, the solid black line indicates the profile of the main baseline economy; the dashed blue
line shows Run 1 (a), in which the government increases lump-sum transfers; and the long-dashed red line
shows Run 1 (b), in which the government reduces marginal income tax rates. Figure 7 shows the policy
effects as percent changes from the baseline averages.
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Figure 7: The Long-Run Effects of Removing Spousal and Survivors Benefits over the Life Cycle (changes





























































































When spousal and survivors benefits were replaced with old-age retirement benefits, the labor force
participation rate of women ages 21–65 would increase, on average, by 1.4% in the long run. The increase
in the participation rate becomes larger as women get older, and the participation rate of women of near-
retirement age would increase more than 3.0%, because those relatively-old workers can predict their future
PIAs more accurately and respond to the policy change. The removal of spousal and survivors benefits would
also increase the average working hours of female worker. However, the increase in the average working
hours is much smaller than the increase in the participation rate. Whether or not women are working is more
important than how many hours they work because OASI benefits are progressive.
The effect of the policy change on the labor supply of men is much smaller than that of women. Only a
small number of male workers receive spousal and survivors benefits in the baseline economy, because male
wage rates are, on average, about 25% higher than female wage rates. The labor force participation rate of
men ages 21–65 changes very little. The average working hours of male workers decrease slightly because
of the higher effective payroll tax rate and the substitution between the husband’s work hours and the wife’s
work hours.
The policy change would increase the total labor supply and the income tax revenue, which would allow
the government to increase lump-sum transfers to households or reduce marginal income tax rates. Private
consumption would increase, on average, by 0.4–0.5% in the long run, although consumption of very old
households (ages 97–100) would decline because of the removal of survivors benefits. The increase rate is
slightly higher when the government reduces marginal income tax rates proportionally to balance the rest of
the government budget. Private wealth would increase, on average, by 0.9–1.1%, which increase is mainly
generated by the reduction in the Social Security’s annuity effect due to the removal of spousal and survivors
benefits.
When spousal and survivors benefits were replaced with old-age retirement benefits, the OASI benefits
would be, on average, larger for retired households ages 78 or younger but smaller for those ages 79 or
older. In the baseline economy, per capita OASI benefits are, on average, increasing by age because some
widow(er)s switch their benefits from their own benefits to survivors benefits when their spouses die.17 After
the policy change, the number of widow(er)ed people would increase as households grow older, but their
OASI benefits would be lower because of the removal of survivors benefits.
17In Figure 6, per capita OASI benefits look decreasing by age because the individual variables, except for working hours, are
growth-adjusted in the model economy.
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Table 4: Long-run Changes in Hours of Market Work of Age-40 Men and Women (changes as a percentage
of the average baseline hours)



















2 m = 1
0.20 0.47 0.98 2.04 4.74 0.20 0.47 0.98 2.04 4.74
Run 1 (a) e11 0.25 -0.4 -0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 -
Increasing e21 0.59 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4 0.6 1.7 0.0 1.4 1.3 0.4 -0.1 0.0 -
lump-sum e31 1.22 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.4 0.7 -0.1 0.5 3.6 2.1 0.4 -0.1 -
transfers e41 2.54 0.3 0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 0.0 4.7 5.0 2.5 -0.1 -
e51 5.91 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.2 6.9 4.5 0.5 -
m = 2 - - - - - 0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.3
Run 1 (b) e11 0.25 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.1 -
Reducing e21 0.59 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 0.7 1.8 0.1 1.5 1.4 0.4 -0.1 0.0 -
income e31 1.22 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.3 0.8 0.0 0.5 3.7 2.2 0.4 0.0 -
tax rates e41 2.54 0.3 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 4.8 5.1 2.6 0.0 -
e51 5.91 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.2 7.0 4.7 0.6 -
m = 2 - - - - - 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.2
Rows, e11, . . . , e
5
1, are male wage levels at age 40 from the lowest to the highest, and columns, e
1
2, . . . , e
5
2, are female
wage levels at age 40.
Table 4 shows the long-run changes in the working hours of age-40 married and single households
from the baseline economy. Rows, e11, . . . , e
5
1, are the husband’s wage levels at age 40, and the columns,
e12, . . . , e
5
2, are the wife’s wage levels. Column m = 1 and row m = 2 show the changes in working hours
of single male and female households, respectively. Because some people do not work outside the home,
the changes in the market work hours of husbands and wives are calculated as percentages of the average
market hours of 40-year-old men and women, respectively, before the policy change.
Under both financing assumptions, the working hours of a majority of married men of age 40 would
decrease slightly as the working hours of their wives increase. However, the working hours of married men




















2), would increase. Married men with the lowest wage rate coupled with women with the highest wage
rate, (e11, e
5
2), would not work before and after the policy change, thus there would be no change in their
working hours. The working hours of single men would increase slightly if their wage rates are relatively
lower but decrease slightly if their wage rates are higher.
The working hours of most married women of age 40 would increase more significantly. The changes
are especially large for married women with moderate wage rates coupled with men with relatively high
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2), because these women are affected most by the
removal of spousal and survivors benefits. The working hours of married women with the lowest wage rate






2), would not work before and after the policy
change, thus there would be no change in their working hours. The working hours of single women would
also increase slightly if their wage rates are relatively lower but decrease slightly if their wage rates are
higher.
4.2 Transition Effects on Macro Economy and Welfare
Table 5 and Figure 8 show the transition effects of removing spousal and survivors benefits from the
current OASI program. In each of these 10 charts in Figure 8, the dashed blue line indicates the percentage
changes from the baseline economy in Run 1 (a) with increasing lump-sum transfers, and the long-dashed
red line indicates the percentage changes in Run 1 (b) with reducing income tax rates.
The total working hours of women would increase by 0.5% in the first year of the policy change and
by 1.6–1.7% in the long run, relative to the baseline level. The increase in female working hours would be
slightly larger in Run 1 (b) because of the lower marginal income tax rates. The labor force participation
rate of women would increase by 1.4% in the long run, but the average working hours of female workers
would increase only by 0.2–0.3% in the long run. As explained in the above, this is due partly to the current
progressive Social Security benefit schedule. If married women do not work at all, after the removal of
spousal and survivors benefits, they will not receive any OA benefits. However, if they work part time even
at lower wages, they will still be eligible for relatively large OA benefits.
The labor force participation rate of men would change very little by the policy change. The total male
working hours as well as the average working hours of male workers would decrease by 0.3 under both
financing assumptions in the long run.
The total labor supply in efficiency units would increase by 0.3–0.4% in the long run. The increase
is relatively small because women with lower wage rates tend to increase their working hours more than
women with higher wage rates after the policy change. Thus, the productivity-weighted labor supply would
not increase as much as the total working hours of men and women combined. The capital stock (national
wealth) would increase by 0.8–1.0%, and the total output (gross domestic product) would increase by 0.5–
0.6% in the long run. Because of the increased economic activity, OASI payroll tax revenue would increase
by 0.5–0.6% in the long run even though the payroll tax rate is kept at the same level. When spousal and
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Table 5: The Effects of Removing Spousal and Survivors Benefits (% changes from the baseline economy)
Run 1 (a) Increasing lump-sum transfers Year Long Run
1 6 11 21 51 81
Capital stock (national wealth) 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.8
Labor supply (in efficiency units) 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Gross domestic product 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5
Private Consumption 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4
Interest rate 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.8 -0.8
Average wage rate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2
Welfare of age-21 households 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5
Transfer spendinga 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Marginal income tax rate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OASI payroll tax revenue 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5
OASI benefit adjustment 8.3 8.4 8.4 8.2 7.9 8.3 8.3
Labor supply: men -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Labor supply: women 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.1
Total working hours: men -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Total working hours: women 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.6 1.6 1.6
Labor participation rate: men 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Labor participation rate: women 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.4
Average work hours: male workers -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Average work hours: female workers 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Run 1 (b) Reducing income tax rates Year Long Run
1 6 11 21 41 81
Capital stock (national wealth) 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.9 1.0 1.0
Labor supply (in efficiency units) 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
Gross domestic product 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6
Private Consumption 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5
Interest rate 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.9 -1.1 -1.1
Average wage rate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.2
Welfare of age-21 households 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.4
Transfer spendinga 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Marginal income tax rate -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6
OASI payroll tax revenue 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6
OASI benefit adjustment 8.4 8.5 8.5 8.3 8.0 8.3 8.3
Labor supply: men -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Labor supply: women 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.2
Total working hours: men -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
Total working hours: women 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.7
Labor participation rate: men 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Labor participation rate: women 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.4
Average work hours: male workers -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
Average work hours: female workers 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
aChanges as percentages of the baseline income tax revenue.
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survivors benefits were removed, the government could increase the old-age retirement benefits by 7.9–8.5%
during the transition path and by 8.3% in the long run to balance the Social Security budget.
The bottom right chart in Figure 8 shows the average welfare change by age cohort. The horizontal
axis is the age of the households when the policy is changed (in year 1). The vertical line in the middle
indicates the youngest age cohort (age-21 households) at the time of the policy change. Households shown
to the left of the vertical line are current households ages 21–100 at the time of the policy change, and those
households shown to the right of the vertical line are future households ages 20 and younger at the time of
the policy change.
The current elderly households ages 61 and older would be aided by the policy change. Their OASI
benefit function is unaffected by the policy change, but their OASI benefits would increase slightly because
of the higher payroll tax revenue due to the larger labor supply. The interest income would also increase
in the short run. These households also receive higher lump-sum transfers or pay lower income taxes.
The spousal and survivors benefits of current households ages 22–60 are partially replaced with the OA
benefits, depending on their age in year 1. Due to the phased-in policy change, the welfare gains of these
households would be smaller for younger households. Because of the higher economic activity and the
lower distortion from the Social Security benefit schedule, the economy grows gradually over the transition
path. Future newborn (age-21) households would be, on average, better off by 0.4–0.5% in the long run with
the consumption equivalence measure.
Even in the short run before the economy fully grows, the phased-in replacement of the spousal and
survivors benefits with the OA benefits would make all age cohorts, on average, better off, although the
policy change would make a majority of young married households worse off in the short run (See Table 6).
Table 6 shows the welfare gains and losses of 21-year-old households in year 1 and in the long run
by their initial wage level. Rows, e11, . . . , e
5
1, correspond to the husband’s wage levels at age 21, and the
columns, e12, . . . , e
5
2, correspond to the wife’s wage levels at age 21. Column m = 1 and row m = 2
and show the welfare gains and losses of single male and female households, respectively. Under both
financing assumptions, the policy change—removing spousal and survivors benefits—would hurt a majority
of married households at age 21 in the short run, but the policy change would aid most married households
in the long run. All single households of age 21 would be better off both in the short run and in the long run.
Married households of age 21 would be worse off significantly if the husband’s wage rate is high and the










2). Some married households with the highest-wage
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Table 6: Welfare Change of Age-21 Households in the Transition Path



















2 m = 1
0.09 0.16 0.28 0.48 0.90 0.09 0.16 0.28 0.48 0.90
Run 1 (a) e11 0.09 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 1.0
Increasing e21 0.18 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.9
lump-sum e31 0.30 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.9
transfers e41 0.52 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.8
e51 0.97 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.8
m = 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9
Run 1 (b) e11 0.09 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.9
Reducing e21 0.18 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.8
income e31 0.30 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.8
tax rates e41 0.52 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.8
e51 0.97 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 0.5 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.9
m = 2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
The consumption equivalence variation measure, %. Rows, e11, . . . , e
5
1, are male wage levels at age 21 from the lowest
to the highest, and columns, e12, . . . , e
5
2, are female wage levels at age 21.
husband, e51, would be worse off even in the long run. Married households would be worse off least in the











2). The welfare gains of single households do not depend significantly on
their initial wage levels, but the welfare gains are slightly increasing in wages in the short run.
4.3 Individual Contributions of Spousal and Survivors Benefits
This section analyzes the effects of removing spousal benefits and survivors benefits separately, and it
discusses the relative importance of these two benefits. As before, the payroll tax rate is kept at the baseline
level, and old-age retirement benefits are increased proportionally to balance the Social Security budget
each year over the transition path. This section only considers the policy changes that assume increasing
lump-sum transfers to balance the rest of the government budget because the overall welfare effect is slightly
better in Run 1 (a) than in 1 (b).
The first panel of Table 7 shows the effects of removing spousal benefits. The labor force participation
rate of women would increase by 0.5% in the long run, but the average working hours of female workers
would not change. Thus, the total working hours of women would also increase by 0.5% in the long run.
Removing spousal benefits accounts for 33% of the increase in female working hours when both benefits
were removed. The average working hours of male workers would decrease by 0.1% in the long run, but the
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Table 7: The Effects of Removing Spousal and Survivors Benefits Separately (increasing lump-sum trans-
fers, % changes from the baseline economy)
Run 2 (a) Removing spousal benefits Year Long Run
1 6 11 21 51 81
Capital stock (national wealth) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Labor supply (in efficiency units) 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Gross domestic product 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Welfare of age-21 households 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OASI payroll tax revenue 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
OASI benefit adjustment 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3
Labor supply: men 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Labor supply: women 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Total working hours: men 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total working hours: women 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Labor participation rate: men 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Labor participation rate: women 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Average work hours: male workers 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Average work hours: female workers 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Run 3 (a) Removing survivors benefits Year Long Run
1 6 11 21 51 81
Capital stock (national wealth) 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.8 0.8
Labor supply (in efficiency units) 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Gross domestic product 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4
Welfare of age-21 households 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5
OASI payroll tax revenue 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4
OASI benefit adjustment 7.1 7.1 7.1 6.8 6.6 7.0 7.0
Labor supply: men -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Labor supply: women 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8
Total working hours: men -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Total working hours: women 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.1 1.1
Labor participation rate: men 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Labor participation rate: women 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0
Average work hours: male workers -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
Average work hours: female workers 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
total working hours of men would be almost unchanged. The total labor supply in efficiency units would
increase by 0.1%, the capital stock would stay at the same level, and total output would increase modestly
by 0.1% in the long run. The welfare of 21-year-old households would also stay at the same level over the
transition path.
The second panel of the same table shows the effect of removing survivors benefits. The labor force
participation rate of women would increase by 1.0% in the long run, and the average working hours of
female workers would increase by 0.2%. Thus, the total working hours of women would increase by 1.1%
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Table 8: Parameter and baseline policy values in the alternative economies
Main Higher Higher Higher
baseline γ ρ ω
Coefficient of relative risk aversion γ 2.0 4.0 2.0 2.0
Autocorrelation parameter of log wage ρ 0.87 0.87 0.92 0.87
Standard deviation of log wage shocks σ 0.39 0.39 0.32 0.38
Intrafamily wage correlation ω 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.40
Discount factor β 0.9804 0.9876 0.9828 0.9798
Growth-adjusted discount factor β˜ 0.9690 0.9546 0.9715 0.9685
Share parameter of consumption α 0.6563 0.6335 0.6470 0.6484
Utility from home production (common) κ1 0.4427 1.3468 0.4702 0.5411
Utility from home production (child care) κ2 1.6928 3.1494 1.5846 0.1263
Time cost parameter of female market work κ 1.1812 1.3124 1.1739 1.0362
Income tax parameters: tax rate limit ϕt 0.3360 0.3410 0.3343 0.3338
married (m = 0) : curvature ϕm,1 0.8564 0.8564 0.8564 0.8564
: scale ϕm,2 0.3604 0.3868 0.3618 0.3723
single (m = 1, 2): curvature ϕm,1 0.6785 0.6785 0.6785 0.6785
: scale ϕm,2 0.4575 0.4839 0.4590 0.4694
Maximum taxable earnings ϑmax 1.8203 1.6761 1.8119 1.7528
Replacement rate threshold: 0.90 & 0.32 ϑ1 0.1520 0.1399 0.1513 0.1463
: 0.32 & 0.15 ϑ2 0.9160 0.8434 0.9118 0.8820
Government consumption CG,t 8.2962 7.6387 8.2575 7.9881
OASI residual TRO 0.2456 0.2153 0.2266 0.2564
Government net worth WG,t 15.898 14.638 15.824 15.308
Accidental bequests per working-age person qt 0.0209 0.0227 0.0214 0.0198
OASI benefit share: workers benefits 80.1–81.2% 80.5% 79.9% 79.2% 80.5%
: spousal benefits 4.1–4.3% 3.9% 4.2% 5.0% 3.6%
: survivors benefits 14.7–15.6% 15.6% 15.8% 15.7% 15.9%
Variance of log labor income by age 0.40–1.00 0.46–0.96 0.43–0.93 0.43–0.97 0.48–0.96
in the long run. Removing survivors benefits accounts for 71% of the increase in female working hours
when both spousal and survivors benefits were removed. The total working hours of men would decrease by
0.3% in the long run, and the total labor supply in efficiency units would increase by 0.2%. The capital stock
and the total output would increase gradually and by 0.8% and 0.4%, respectively, in the long run. These
macroeconomic effects are about the same as those of removing both benefits in Run 1 (a). The welfare
effect on age-21 households is also similar. On average, 21-year-old households would be better off by
0.5% in the long run.
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Table 9: The Long-Run Effects of Removing Spousal and Survivors Benefits in Alternative Economies (%
changes from the baseline economy)
Main Higher γ Higher ρ Higher ω
1 (a) 1 (b) 4 (a) 4 (b) 5 (a) 5 (b) 6 (a) 6 (b)
Capital stock (national wealth) 0.8 1.0 1.4 1.9 1.0 1.2 0.8 1.0
Labor supply (in efficiency units) 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4
Gross domestic product 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.6
Welfare of age-21 households 0.5 0.4 1.2 1.0 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4
OASI payroll tax revenue 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.6
OASI benefit adjustment 8.3 8.3 8.8 8.9 9.8 9.9 8.0 8.1
Labor supply: men -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2
Labor supply: women 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2
Total working hours: men -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3
Total working hours: women 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.0 1.6 1.7
Labor participation rate: men 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
Labor participation rate: women 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.8 1.3 1.4
Average work hours: male workers -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Average work hours: female workers 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
aChanges as percentages of the baseline income tax revenue.
5 Policy Reform in the Alternative Baseline Economies
How would the effects of removing spousal and survivors benefits differ depending on the model as-
sumptions? This section shows the policy effects in three alternative baseline economies: the economy with
a higher coefficient of relative risk aversion (Run 4), the economy with a higher persistence in wage shocks
(Run 5), and the economy consisting of married couples with a higher wage correlation (Run 6). These
baseline economies assume the same target values for the capital–output ratio, the Frisch elasticity of work-
ing hours, labor participation rates, income tax revenue as a share of GDP, and factor prices as those in the
main baseline economy. Table 8 shows the revised parameter values and the corresponding OASI benefit
shares in these alternative baseline economies.
In the first alternative baseline economy, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, is increased from 2.0
to 4.0. Then, the intra-temporal (intra-household) elasticity of substitution of the husband’s work hours for
the wife’s work hours is also changed, although the Frisch elasticity of the average worker is kept at 0.5. The
elasticity of substitution is decreased to 1−h¯
h¯
1
1−(1−α)(1−γ) = 0.3284 from 0.4493. In this baseline economy,
the shares of spousal and survivors benefits in the total OASI benefits are 4.2% and 15.8%, respectively,
which are a little higher than the shares in the main baseline economy.
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Table 9 shows the long-run effects of removing spousal and survivors benefits in the three alternative
economies as well as the main baseline economy. In Runs 4 (a) and 4 (b), the total working hours of women
would increase by 1.5–1.7% relative to the new baseline economy. The labor participation rate of women
would rise by 1.3–1.4%, and the average working hours of female workers would increase by 0.2–0.3%. The
increase in the female labor supply is not very different in this alternative economy from the main baseline
economy, even though the elasticity of substitution is smaller.
The overall macroeconomic effects are larger than those in Runs 1 (a) and 1 (b). The total labor supply
in efficiency units would increase by 0.4–0.5%, the capital stock would increase by 1.4–1.9%, and the
total output would increase by 0.7–1.0% in the long run. The slightly larger change in the total labor
supply is explained by the higher wage rate generated by the larger increase in precautionary savings, as the
households in the alternative economy are more risk averse. The welfare of 21-year-old households would
improve significantly by 1.0–1.2% in the long run.
In the second alternative baseline economy, the autocorrelation of wages, ρ, is increased from 0.87 to
0.92. Then, the new transition matrix single workers that corresponds to ρ = 0.92 is calculated as
Πe1,i = Πe2,i =

0.8294 0.1706 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0515 0.8162 0.1323 0.0000 0.0000
0.0000 0.0868 0.8264 0.0868 0.0000
0.0000 0.0000 0.1323 0.8162 0.0515
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1706 0.8294
 .
When the transitory wage shocks are more persistent, workers can predict their future wage rates and
OASI primary insurance amounts more accurately before making the decisions on labor participation and
working hours. So, the shares of spousal and survivors benefits in total OASI benefits become larger, 5.0%
and 15.8%, respectively, in this alternative economy. Thus, when these benefits are replaced with old-age
retirement benefits, the households would likely make larger labor supply and saving responses to the policy
change.
In Runs 5 (a) and 5 (b), the total working hours of women would increase by 1.9–2.0% in the long run
relative to the new baseline economy. Not surprisingly, the labor supply response is larger than those in
Runs 1 (a) and 1 (b). The labor force participation rate of women would increase by 1.7–1.8% in the long
run, and the average working hours of female workers would increase by 0.2%. The macroeconomic and
welfare effects of the policy change are also a little larger than those in the main baseline economy. The total
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labor supply in efficiency units would increase by 0.4%, the capital stock would increase by 1.0–1.2%, and
the total output would increase by 0.6–0.7% in the long run. The welfare of 21-year-old households would
improve by 0.5–0.6% in the long run.
In the third alternative baseline economy, the correlation between the husband’s wage and the wife’s
wage is assumed to be 0.4, increased from 0.25 in the main baseline economy. Under this assumption, the
husband’s wage and the wife’s wage are relatively close to each other, thus fewer couples would expect to
receive spousal benefits. Indeed, the share of spousal benefits in total OASI benefits is decreased to 3.6%,
although the share of survivors benefits is increased to 15.9%, in this new baseline economy. So, the changes
in the effect of removing spousal and survivors benefits would be ambiguous.
In Runs 6 (a) and 6 (b), the total working hours of women would increase by 1.6–1.7% in the long run.
The labor participation rate of women would increase by 1.3–1.4%, which are very close to the increase
rates in the main baseline economy. The average working hours of female workers would increase by 0.3%.
Thus, the effect on the total labor supply is not very different from those in the main baseline economy. The
total labor supply in efficiency units would increase by 0.3–0.4% in the long run, the capital stock would
increase by 0.8–1.0%, and the total output would increase by 0.5–0.6%. The average welfare of 21-year-old
households would improve by 0.4–0.5% in the long run.
Overall, the effects of removing spousal and survivors benefits on the female labor supply, macroe-
conomic variables, and social welfare would depend on the values of several parameters assumed in the
baseline economy. However, the effects on the overall macro economy and welfare would not differ greatly
in the alternative baseline economies considered above, so long as the shares of spousal and survivors ben-
efits in the baseline economies are consistent with the data.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper extends a standard heterogeneous-agent general-equilibrium OLG model with idiosyncratic
wage shocks by incorporating both the joint decision making of married households and the OASI spousal
and survivors benefits. The model is calibrated to the current-law U.S. economy and used to analyze the
possible labor supply, macroeconomic, and welfare effects of removing the survivors and spousal benefits.
According to the numerical policy experiments, in the long run, the removal of those benefits would
increase the labor participation of women by 1.4% and the average working hours of female workers by
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0.2–0.3%, thus the policy change would increase the total working hours of women by 1.6–1.7%. The policy
change would also increase the overall labor supply, the capital stock, and the total output of the economy.
Although its macroeconomic effects are not very large, the model predicts that replacing the spousal and
survivors benefits with regular old-age benefits would make all age cohorts—current and future—over the
transition path, on average, better off if the budget surplus due to the higher economic activity is redistributed
by either increasing lump-sum transfers or cutting marginal income tax rates.
To make the model and the decision making of married couples as simple as possible, this paper assumes
a unitary utility model of married households. This means that a husband and a wife are considered fully
altruistic to each other and that they jointly choose their optimal consumption, working hours, and savings.
Also, this paper does not consider the possibilities of divorce and remarrying, because keeping the histor-
ical earnings of ex-spouses as state variables would make the general equilibrium model computationally
intractable. Due to precautionary motives, however, the risk of separation would likely affect labor supply
and saving decisions. Introducing imperfect altruism, the strategic interactions between a husband and a
wife, and marriage and divorce decisions is left for future studies.
In addition to Social Security reform plans, the model developed in this paper could predict the effects
of various changes in fiscal policy and technology. The model could address issues such as how much the
female labor supply would increase if the wage disparity between men and women was reduced, the effects
of private firms changing their policy on health insurance coverage, the ramifications of the government
subsidizing the cost of daycare services, and so on. An extended version of the model would also help
policymakers weigh the costs and benefits of different designs for the Social Security OASI program.
A Computational Algorithm
The household’s optimization problem in this paper is solved recursively from age i = I to 21 by
discretizing the asset space, A = [0, amax], into 27 nodes, Aˆ = {a1, a2, . . . , a27}, the average historical
earning space, B = [0, bmax], into 15 nodes each, Bˆ = {b1, b2, . . . , b15}, and the working ability space,
E = [0, emax], into 5 nodes for a husband and a wife of each age, Eˆ1,i = {e11,i, e21,i, . . . , e51,i} and Eˆ2,i =
{e12,i, e22,i, . . . , e52,i}.
Let Ωt be a time series of vectors of factor prices and government policy variables that describes a future
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path of the aggregate economy,
Ωt =
{




The household’s value function is shown as v(s,St; Ψt), and factor prices and the government’s endogenous
policy variables are shown as rs(Ss; Ψs), ws(Ss; Ψs), ψs(Ss; Ψs), and so on, for s ≥ t. However, it is
impossible to solve the model of this form because the dimension of St is infinite. This paper avoids this
curse of dimensionality problem, without changing the solution, by replacing (St,Ψt) with Ωt. Because
the model economy does not include aggregate shocks, the time series Ωt is deterministic and perfectly
foreseeable by the household; thus, it will suffice to find the fixed point of Ωt to solve the model economy
for an equilibrium transition path.
This appendix first explains the algorithm to solve the household’s optimization problem for each indi-
vidual state node,
s = (i, a, b1, b2, e1, e2,m) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , I} × Aˆ× Bˆ2 × Eˆ1,i × Eˆ2,i × {0, 1, 2},
taking Ωt as given. The appendix next explains the algorithm to find the household’s labor participation de-
cisions. For numerical methods used to solve a Kuhn–Tucker condition for a household’s optimal decision,
see Judd (1998) and Miranda and Fackler (2002). For a more general algorithm to compute steady-state
equilibrium and an equilibrium transition path, see Nishiyama and Smetters (2014).
A.1 Algorithm to Solve the Household Problem
The household’s optimization problem can be solved backward from i = I to 21 by assuming the
terminal value v(s; Ωt+1)
∣∣
i=I+1
= 0. Let vˆ(s; Ωt) be the value function without the current utility from
home production, χ(h1, h2,m, nm,i). The household’s problem at age i in period t is modified to
vˆ(s; Ωt) = max
c,l1,l2
{




subject to the constraints for the decision variables,
0 < c ≤ cmax, h1 = 1− l1, h2 = 1− κnm,i − l2,
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0 < l1 ≤ 1 if m 6= 2, l1 = 1 if m = 2,
0 < l2 ≤ 1− κnm,i if m 6= 1, l2 = 1− κnm,i if m = 1,
and the law of motion of the state variables,








cmax = (1 + rt)a+ wte1h1 + wte2h2 − τI,t(rta+ wte1h1 + wte2h2;m,nm,i)− τP,t(wte1h1, wte2h2)












(i− 21)b1 + min(wtejh1, ϑmax)
]
+ 1{i≥IR or m=2}b1,




(i− 21)b2 + min(wtejh2, ϑmax)
]
+ 1{i≥IR or m=1}b2.
Let the objective function be




The first-order conditions for an interior solution are then







f2(c, l1, l2; s,Ωt) = u2(c, l1, l2;m)(19)
− wte1
[










f3(c, l1, l2; s,Ωt) = u3(c, l1, l2;m)(20)
− wte2
[










where τ ′I,t(rta+wte1h1+wte2h2;m,nm,i) and τP,k,t(wte1h1, wte2h2) are the marginal income tax rate and
the marginal payroll tax rate with respect to the kth argument, respectively. The equation (18) is the Euler
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equation, and the equations (19) and (20) are the marginal rate of substitution conditions of consumption for
leisure.
With the inequality constraints for the decision variables, the Kuhn–Tucker conditions of the household’s
problem are expressed as the following nonlinear complementarity problem,
f1(c, l1, l2; s,Ωt) = 0 if 0 < c < cmax, > 0 if c = cmax,
f2(c, l1, l2; s,Ωt) = 0 if 0 < l1 < 1, > 0 if l1 = 1,
f3(c, l1, l2; s,Ωt) = 0 if 0 < l2 < 1− κnm,i, > 0 if l2 = 1− κnm,i,





f1(c, l1, l2; s,Ωt)/u1(c, l1, l2;m)
f2(c, l1, l2; s,Ωt)/u1(c, l1, l2;m)











1− κnm,i − l2

 = 0,
where ε is a small positive number. Following Miranda and Fackler (2002), the min(u, v) and max(u, v)
operators are replaced with the Fischer–Burmeister function and its variation,
φ−(u, v) ≡ u+ v −
√
u2 + v2, φ+(u, v) ≡ u+ v +
√
u2 + v2,
respectively, to make the above system of equations differentiable without altering the solutions. The equa-
tion (21) can be solved for cˆ(s; Ωt), lˆ1(s; Ωt), and lˆ2(s; Ωt) by using a Newton-type nonlinear equation
solver, NEQNF, of the IMSL Fortran Numerical Library. Then, the other decisions, hˆ1(s; Ωt), hˆ2(s; Ωt),
aˆ′(s; Ωt), bˆ′1(s; Ωt), and bˆ′2(s; Ωt) are obtained.18
Once the optimal decisions are obtained, next the value of the household with state s in period t, before
the utility from home production, is calculated as





18NEQNF uses a modified Powell hybrid algorithm and a finite-difference approximation to the Jacobian.
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and the corresponding marginal values are calculated as




1− τ ′I,t(rta+ wte1hˆ1(s; Ωt) + wte2hˆ2(s; Ωt));m,nm,i
)]
(23)
× uc(cˆ(s; Ωt), lˆ1(s; Ωt), lˆ2(s; Ωt);m),


























where trSS,b1,t(i, b1, b2,m) and trSS,b2,t(i, b1, b2,m) are the marginal OASI benefits corresponding to b1
and b2, respectively. These marginal values are used to solve the optimization problem of age i−1 in period





1{ψ(i,b1)≥0.5ψ(i,b2)}ψb(i, b1) + 1{ψ(i,b1)>2.0ψ(i,b2)}0.5ψb(i, b1)
]
if m = 0,





1{ψ(i,b2)≥0.5ψ(i,b1)}ψb(i, b2) + 1{ψ(i,b2)>2.0ψ(i,b1)}0.5ψb(i, b2)
]
if m = 0,
ψt1{ψ(i,b2)≥ψ(i,b1)}ψb(i, b2) if m = 1, 2,
where ψb(i, bj) is the marginal primary insurance amount (PIA) function,
ψb(i, bj) = 1{i≥IR}(1 + µ)
60−i{1{bj<ϑ1}0.90 + 1{ϑ1≤bj<ϑ2}0.32 + 1{ϑ2≤bj}0.15}
for j = 1 and 2. The marginal benefit functions in the economy without spousal and survivors benefits are
tr1SS,b1,t(i, b1, b2,m) = ψtψb(i, b1) if m = 0 or 1, = 0 if m = 2,
tr1SS,b2,t(i, b1, b2,m) = ψtψb(i, b2) if m = 0 or 2, = 0 if m = 1.
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A.2 Algorithm to Find Labor Participation Decisions
Let’s assume the household is married (m = 0). This paper first solves the household problem with-
out any restriction for cˆ(s; Ωt), hˆ1(s; Ωt), hˆ2(s; Ωt), aˆ′(s; Ωt), bˆ′1(s; Ωt), bˆ′2(s; Ωt), vˆ(s; Ωt), vˆa(s; Ωt),
vˆb1(s; Ωt), and vˆb2(s; Ωt). If hˆ1(s; Ωt) = 0 or hˆ2(s; Ωt) = 0 or both, the expected value of this household,
with additional utility from staying at home, is set as
(26) v(s; Ωt) = vˆ(s; Ωt) + E
[
χ(hˆ1(s; Ωt), hˆ2(s; Ωt);m,nm,i)
]
,
and the decision rules and value functions are set as
c(s; Ωt) = cˆ(s; Ωt), h1(s; Ωt) = hˆ1(s; Ωt), h2(s; Ωt) = hˆ2(s; Ωt),(27)




2(s; Ωt) = bˆ
′
2(s; Ωt),
va(s; Ωt) = vˆa(s; Ωt), vb1(s; Ωt) = vˆb1(s; Ωt), vb2(s; Ωt) = vˆb2(s; Ωt).
If hˆ1(s; Ωt) ≥ hˆ2(s; Ωt) > 0, this paper solves the above household problem again with an additional con-
straint h2 = 0 for cˆ(s; Ωt, h2 = 0), hˆ1(s; Ωt, h2 = 0), aˆ′(s; Ωt, h2 = 0), bˆ′1(s; Ωt, h2 = 0), bˆ′2(s; Ωt, h2 =
0), vˆ(s; Ωt, h2 = 0), vˆa(s; Ωt, h2 = 0), vˆb1(s; Ωt, h2 = 0), and vˆb2(s; Ωt, h2 = 0). Then, the expected
value with additional utility from staying at home is obtained as
v(s; Ωt) = Pr(χ˜ ≤ d)vˆ(s; Ωt) + Pr(χ˜ > d)
{
vˆ(s; Ωt, h2 = 0) + E[χ˜|χ˜ > d]
}
(28)
= vˆ(s; Ωt) + Pr(χ˜ > d)E[χ˜− d|χ˜ > d]
= vˆ(s; Ωt) + E[(χ˜− d)+],
where χ˜ = χ
(
hˆ1(s; Ωt, h2 = 0), 0;m,nm,i
)
, d = vˆ(s; Ωt)− vˆ(s; Ωt, h2 = 0), and








tα−1e−tdt, α > 0, x > 0.
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The decision rules and value functions are set as
{c(s; Ωt), h1(s; Ωt), h2(s; Ωt), a′(s; Ωt), b′1(s; Ωt), b′2(s; Ωt)}(30)
=

{cˆ(s; Ωt), hˆ1(s; Ωt), hˆ2(s; Ωt), aˆ′(s; Ωt), bˆ′1(s; Ωt), bˆ′2(s; Ωt)} with prob. Pr(χ˜ ≤ d),
{cˆ(s; Ωt, h2 = 0), hˆ1(s; Ωt, h2 = 0), hˆ2(s; Ωt, h2 = 0),
aˆ′(s; Ωt, h2 = 0), bˆ′1(s; Ωt, h2 = 0), bˆ′2(s; Ωt, h2 = 0)} with prob. Pr(χ˜ > d),
va(s; Ωt) = Pr(χ˜ ≤ d)vˆa(s; Ωt) + Pr(χ˜ > d)vˆa(s; Ωt, h2 = 0),(31)
vb1(s; Ωt) = Pr(χ˜ ≤ d)vˆb1(s; Ωt) + Pr(χ˜ > d)vˆb1(s; Ωt, h2 = 0),(32)
vb1(s; Ωt) = Pr(χ˜ ≤ d)vˆb2(s; Ωt) + Pr(χ˜ > d)vˆb2(s; Ωt, h2 = 0).(33)
If instead hˆ2(s; Ωt) > hˆ1(s; Ωt) > 0, then the above household problem with an additional constraint h1 =
0 is solved for cˆ(s; Ωt, h1 = 0), hˆ1(s; Ωt, h1 = 0), aˆ′(s; Ωt, h1 = 0), bˆ′1(s; Ωt, h1 = 0), bˆ′2(s; Ωt, h1 = 0),
vˆ(s; Ωt, h1 = 0), vˆa(s; Ωt, h1 = 0), vˆb1(s; Ωt, h1 = 0), and vˆb2(s; Ωt, h1 = 0); and the rest of the
algorithm is the same as above. The algorithm is similar when the household is single (m = 1 or m = 2).
References
[1] Attanasio, Orazio, Hamish Low, and Virginia Sa´nchez-Marcos. 2008. “Explaining Changes in Female
Labor Supply in a Life-Cycle Model.” American Economic Review, 98(4): 1517–22.
[2] Auerbach, Alan J., and Laurence J. Kotlikoff. 1987. Dynamic Fiscal Policy. Cambridge, UK: Cam-
bridge University Press.
[3] Bernheim, Douglas, Lorenzo Forni, Jagadeesh Gokhale, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff. 2003. “The Mis-
match Between Life Insurance Holdings and Financial Vulnerabilities: Evidence from the Health and
Retirement Study.” American Economic Review, 93(1): 354–65.
[4] Bethencourt, Carlos, and Virginia Sa´nchez-Marcos. 2014. “The Effect of Public Pensions on Women’s
Labor Market Participation over a Full Life-Cycle.” Manuscript, University of La Laguna and Univer-
sity of Cantabria.
49
[5] Brown, Jeffrey R., and James M. Poterba. 2000. “Joint Life Annuities and Annuity Demand by Married
Couples.” Journal of Risk and Insurance, 67(4): 527–54.
[6] U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2013a. “Civilian Labor Force Participation Rates by Age, Sex, Race,
and Ethnicity.” BLS Employment Projections. http://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_table_303.
htm (Last accessed on September 3, 2014).
[7] U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2013b. “Highlights of Women’s Earnings in 2012.” BLS Report 1045.
[8] Conesa, Juan C., Sagiri Kitao, and Dirk Krueger. 2009. “Taxing Capital? Not a Bad Idea After All!”
American Economic Review, 99(1): 25–48.
[9] Conesa, Juan C., and Dirk Krueger. 1999. “Social Security Reform with Heterogeneous Agents.” Re-
view of Economic Dynamics, 2(4): 757–95.
[10] Domeij, David, and Jonathan Heathcote. 2004. “On the Distributional Effects of Reducing Capital
Taxes.” International Economic Review, 45 (2): 523–54.
[11] Gouveia, Miguel, and Robert P. Strauss. 1994. “Effective Federal Individual Income Tax Functions:
An Exploratory Empirical Analysis.” National Tax Journal, 47(2): 317–39.
[12] Guner, Nezih, Remzi Kaygusuz, and Gustavo Ventura. 2012a. “Taxing Women: A Macroeconomic
Analysis.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 59: 111–28.
[13] Guner, Nezih, Remzi Kaygusuz, and Gustavo Ventura. 2012b. “Taxation and Household Labour Sup-
ply.” Review of Economic Studies, 79: 1113–49.
[14] Hong, Jay H., and Jose´-Vı´ctor Rı´os-Rull. 2007. “Social Security, Life Insurance and Annuities for
Families.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 54: 118–40.
[15] Huggett, Mark, and Juan Carlos Parra. 2010. “How Well Does the U.S. Social Insurance System Pro-
vide Social Insurance?” Journal of Political Economy, 118(1): 76–112.
[16] Hyslop, Dean R. 2001. “Rising U.S. Earnings Inequality and Family Labor Supply: The Covariance
Structure of Intrafamily Earnings.” American Economic Review, 91(4): 755–77.
[17] I˙mrohorog˘lu, Ais¸e, Selahattin I˙mrohorog˘lu, and Douglas Joines. 1995. “A Life Cycle Analysis of
Social Security.” Economic Theory, 6(1): 83–114.
50
[18] Judd, Kenneth L. 1998. Numerical Methods in Economics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
[19] Kaygusuz, Remzi. 2010. “Taxes and Female Labor Supply.” Review of Economic Dynamics, 13:725–
41.
[20] Kaygusuz, Remzi. 2014. “Social Security and Two-Earner Households.” Manuscript, Sabancı Univer-
sity.
[21] Kotlikoff, Laurence J., Kent Smetters, and Jan Walliser. 1999. “Privatizing Social Security in the
United States—Comparing the Options.” Review of Economic Dynamics, 2(4): 532–74.
[22] Kotlikoff, Laurence J., and Avia Spivak. 1981. “The Family as an Incomplete Annuities Market.”
Journal of Political Economy, 89(2): 372–91.
[23] Miranda, Mario J., and Paul L. Fackler. 2002. “Applied Computational Economics and Finance,” Cam-
bridge, MA: MIT Press.
[24] Nishiyama, Shinichi, and Kent Smetters. 2007. “Does Social Security Privatization Produce Efficiency
Gains?” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(4): 1677–719.
[25] Nishiyama, Shinichi, and Kent Smetters. 2014. “Analyzing Fiscal Policies in a Heterogeneous-Agent
Overlapping-Generations Economy.” Kenneth L. Judd and Karl Schmedders, eds., Handbook of Com-
putational Economics, Volume 3, Chapter 3.
[26] Olivetti, Claudia. 2006. “Changes in Women’s Hours of Market Work: The Role of Returns to Experi-
ence.” Review of Economic Dynamics, 9: 557–87.
[27] Social Security Administration. 2014. “Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin,
2013.” SSA Publication 13-11700.
[28] United Nations. 2008. “World Fertility Data 2008: Period Fertility Indicators.” United Nations, http:
//www.un.org/esa/population/publications/WFD%202008/Main.html.
51
